Should the Pacers double their trouble against mismatches?

On whether to hit the switch 

By: Caitlin Cooper I @C2_Cooper

When Austin Reaves amassed a career high of 45 points in a win over the Pacers at the start of February, he was sitting on 22 points in 24 minutes played when this possession occurred.

Without either of LeBron James or Luka Doncic available, Reaves had the ball early and often for the Lakers, as he was presented with two potential paths at the top of the key: dribble left out of horns toward Pascal Siakam or right (very literally) in the direction of Tyrese Haliburton. For Reaves, the decision was simple. He chose Haliburton. The Pacers, meanwhile, also chose Haliburton, in that they decided to rely on him to switch. Notably, after chasing over on the screen, Ben Sheppard veered back toward the screener and then stayed attached to the screener, even as Reaves took five-plus dribbles against Haliburton. To his credit, Haliburton stayed in front, and the end result was a mid-range two. But, the end result was also a mid-range two from the player who had already scored 22 points in 24 minutes without James nor Doncic in uniform.

In a nutshell, what played out on that possession, as far as how much the Pacers should "choose" Haliburton when opponents "choose" Haliburton, is a question with an evolving-answer, both since the playoffs and likely headed into the playoffs.

During last season's run to the Eastern Conference Finals, Haliburton only switched on 10.08 percent of the ball-screens he guarded as the screener defender. This season, he's switched on 17.2 percent, including 18.55 percent since the team's surge on the defensive end following the four-day break for the NBA Cup.

Put simply, the Pacers are putting more trust in him to guard in those situations -- at least by comparison to the playoffs. Or, are they? After all, a similar situation to that against Reaves played out during crunch-time in Miami. With Tyler Herro headed downhill toward Haliburton, Nembhard followed the same script as Sheppard, veering back to the screener while leaving Indiana's star guard alone to guard.

Only, unlike Sheppard, he didn't just leave Haliburton alone to guard. When Herro passed the ball ahead and got it back to size up the mismatch, Nembhard started to approach as though he was going to hit the switch, blitzing the isolation to get the ball out of Herro's hands. Herro obliged, but Davion Mitchell proceeded to drain a wide open, go-ahead three-pointer with less than 45 seconds to play.

That's tough! Mitchell isn't exactly known for his shooting prowess, but he's gone 11-of-22 on catch-and-shoot threes since being traded to Miami. Meanwhile, it also begs pointing out that Heat players other than Tyler Herro shot 14-of-22 from three against the Pacers in this game. As such, what played out is effectively two different approaches. The Pacers didn't trap on the possession against Reaves, and they did trap -- or, at least started to trap -- on the possession against Herro. Of course, they don't get the benefit of hindsight when making these decisions in real-time, but they ended up paying a price in both cases. So, if they shouldn't have trapped Herro, were they right not to trap Reaves? Or, if they should've trapped Reaves, were they right to trap Herro? Moving forward, those evaluations should arguably have less to do with Reaves, Herro, or whatever other ball-handler happens to be targeting Haliburton, than who is on the floor with Reaves, Herro, or whatever other ball-handler happens to be targeting Haliburton.

Look back at that possession against the Lakers. The player in the weak-side corner is Jarred Vanderbilt, who has attempted a total of 129 corner threes in his seven-year career, averaging 0.45 per game. If Sheppard had hit the switch, blitzing the isolation, then Siakam could've rotated to the top of the key, with Nesmith guarding the dunker spot.

If Reaves makes the skip pass to the corner, then the Pacers have arguably lessened their burdens rather than doubling their trouble. Now, compare that to what played out against Miami. Notably, the next nearest player to Mitchell is Duncan Robinson, who had already made two threes off passes from Mitchell in the fourth quarter.

Needless to say, Robinson isn't Jarred Vanderbilt. There's a reason why Nesmith is face-guarding him at the wing. Alternatively, if Siakam rotates up from the corner, then Turner is going to be left guarding two bigs at once along the baseline. For that reason, these decisions arguably need to be more context specific. If Reaves is on the floor with Vanderbilt in the weak-side corner and neither James nor Doncic is available, there's probably reason to trap him. Conversely, if the Heat are making every shot in sight, maybe don't trap Herro. Or, at least be better at trapping Herro.

In that case, Nembhard isn't so much blitzing the switch as he is merely shifting to the nail in somewhat of a passive next. If he's going to pull that far over, it seems as though it would be preferable for him to approach with his body in the passing lane.

That way, when Herro makes the pass to the less threatening player, the Pacers might force a turnover or at least get him to put a little more air under the ball, buying time for everyone else to rotate. Likewise, even if Nesmith isn't going to rotate from Robinson, maybe he could've at least stunted a bit toward Mitchell to throw off his rhythm? Still, on a night when the Heat were living up to their namesake as far as turning up the heat around the arc, that geometry was always going to be tricky to navigate. Of course, if the Pacers didn't actually trust Haliburton to switch in that situation, they also could've just not switched.

Then again, that's what they tried less than a minute earlier, when Herro split the defense, with Haliburton jumping out above the level of the screen at the logo.

In the playoffs, the Pacers only gave up 0.865 points per chance on possessions when he was the screener defender. He had some loud gaffes overcommitting himself at times, as can be seen above, but the larger tax of playing hedge-and-recover arguably was felt more so on offense and defense. For example, consider Game 5 against the Knicks, when he guarded more ball-screens as the screener defender (21) than he piloted as the pick-and-roll ball-handler (16). Granted, he also spent a lot of that game being face-guarded by Deuce McBride, but repeatedly defending that far from the basket, while taking a bump and oftentimes having to peel off to the perimeter, is also exhausting.

Over the last 33 games, in which the Pacers have posted a 23-10 record while ranking 11th in defensive rating, they've allowed fewer points per chance with him in hedge-and-recover as the screener defender (0.986) than switching (1.000), and the same was the case in the playoffs. And yet, just as there has been more of a concerted effort for him to be more aggressive earlier against exaggerated coverages, it's possible that "trusting" him to switch more often, regardless of the numbers, might be a play in the long-term to maintain his aggressiveness at the other end of the floor, as much as finding out how much everyone else has to shrink in order for him to stand up in those situations.

In that regard, they've definitely taken some metaphorical hits when they hit (glanced at?) the switch. Not only in the most recent loss to Miami, but also when they eventually started doubling Reaves, with Jordan Goodwin banking in a three from the wing, as Haliburton momentarily lost his place rotating out of the trap. Still, just for emphasis, Goodwin banked in a three on a night when Reaves had amassed 45 points when James and Doncic weren't available.

All of which is to say that, the answer with regard to how much the Pacers should "choose" Haliburton when opponents "choose" Haliburton hasn't just evolved since last season's playoffs, it needs to continue to evolve both now and during this season's playoffs, with the choice being more often dictated by factors other than just Haliburton and whichever player happens to be targeting him.

Granted, by comparison to Reaves picking whether to drive at Siakam or Haliburton, those decisions aren't always as easy for the Pacers, as a team that also has to constantly weigh the potential gravitational waves on the glass of creating holes with double teams. More than anything, as applies to their scheme as a whole, if they're going to fully commit, then with regard to energy and attention to detail, they have to actually fully commit.