Battle of Jiksan: additional context and trivia

As promised, this post contains additional contents, contexts, and trivias for my Battle of Jiksan article that are either too lengthy/jumbled to be included in the main article, or something that may be interesting to know about, presented in numbered point format and best read as a companion article to my previous one. Unlike the main article, this post will remain exclusive to my supporters indefinitely.

1. The defeat of Battle of Chilcheollyang is often blamed on the incompetence of Won Gyun (원균 or 元均), admiral of Joseon navy at the time. However, while he was certainly not entirely blameless, the main culpability laid at the decisions made by (a bunch of ministers with no naval experience whatsoever inside) Joseon court to (1) either split the fleet to garrison both Hansan Island and Geoje Island or abandon Hansan Island and relocate to Geoje Island entirely, and (2) interdict the Nagoya-Tsushima-Busan supply line directly, ignoring the fact that:

• entire coast between Hansan Island and Busan was under Japanese control, and

• Hansan Island is pretty far from Busan. A Joseon fleet en route to attack Busan would've needed to dock somewhere to rest its oarsmen, and there were only so many places large enough to accommodate a war fleet. Thus it was extremely easy for the Japanese to predict where a Joseon fleet would dock to rest, and set up ambush accordingly—and this was exactly what happened during Battle of Chilcheollyang.

A large part of the reason why admiral Yi Sun-sin (이순신 or 李舜臣) was jailed is because he thought the idea was stupid and refused to obey the order several times until he was given an ultimatum and forced to comply, thus angering the king. It is unreasonable to expect Won Gyun to successfully pull off a plan that even Yi Sun-sin thought was dumb.

2. All but one land battles (i.e. Siege of Hwangseoksanseong) during the second invasion were fought by either Ming army alone or Ming army supported by Joseon troops. Ming army also fought most of the skirmishes too.

3. Sobaek mountain range (coloured red in the map below) serves as a natural barrier separating Jeolla Province and Gyeongsang Province. The reason why Namwon was strategically critical is because it sits at the vital juncture connecting the two provinces.

(It should be noted that during the first invasion Japanese army blitzed north and captured Hanseong first, then split up to suppress each of the provinces. Thus Japanese 6th Division was able to invade Jeolla Province from the north, bypassing the mountain range.)

It was theoretically possible to trap the entire Japanese invasion force inside Gyeongsang Province, or at least severely delaying its advance, if Namwon City and its counterpart, Joryeong Pass (which connects to Chungcheong Province) could be defended. Obviously, such endeavours were easier said than done, and both Battle of Chungju and Siege of Namwon ended in disasters.

4. Such was the abysmal state of Joseon army, that the 700 Joseon troops under commander Yi Bok-nam (이복남 or 李福男) that fought side by side with Ming army during Siege of Namwon weren't even from Namwon garrison (it had none). They were actually recalled from another mission and had to fight through Japanese encirclement to get into the city. Of the initial 1,000 Joseon troops, only about 700 made it through.

5. Toyotomi Hideyoshi took a far more cautious and methodological approach to the second invasion. To this end, he ordered his commanders to capture as many able-bodied Koreans as possible and bring them back to Japan, and kill off the rest. This was the reason why Japanese army was far more cruel during the second invasion, going so far as to specifically root out and massacre Korean refugees hiding in the mountains.

Captured Koreans would then be forced to work on the lands, freeing up Japanese farmers to be levied into the army to fuel the war effort.

6. Unsurprisingly, Hanseong was already in a state of panic by this time. Yang Hao rushed from Pyongyang to Hanseong to calm the panic as early as October 13, 1597, and King Yi Yeon of Joseon came in tears to beg him to save Joseon Kingdom the next day. Unfortunately, Yang Hao knew that Ming army was severely outnumbered, so he only gave a vague promise to the effect of "he will try his best", which did little to reassure the king.

7. Small trivia on the ethnicity of Ming commanders: Xing Jie (邢玠) and Yang Hao (楊鎬) were Han; Ma Gui (麻貴) was a Hui; Jie Sheng (解生), Bai Sai (擺塞), Po Gui (頗貴) and Yang Deng Shan (楊登山) were Mongolian; and Niu Bo Ying (牛伯英) was a Han.

8. It should be noted that 5,000 was the full strength of Kuroda Nagamasa's army in Korea, so this number should be taken with the following caveats:

• It also includes logistical personnel and other non-combatants.

• Kuroda Nagamasa participated in Siege of Hwangseoksanseong so his army likely already suffered some casualties before Battle of Jiksan.

• Other than the 2,000 troops he personally led, it is unclear how many more troops were committed into the fight during different phases of Battle of Jiksan.

9. Interestingly, frontline report from Ming army describes five to six hundred Japanese troops being "shot and (then) bludgeon to death", suggesting that (at least some) Ming cavalry were armed with some kind of blunt instrument. This matches with the experience of Nomura Ichiemon, who had a close encounter with a Ming cavalry armed with a flail.

10. Since no notable officer died during Battle of Jiksan and Sosapyeong, it is probably safe to assume that Japanese army did not suffer the kind of disproportionately heavy losses like Battle of Byeokjegwan. Nevertheless, it is possible that Kuroda Nagamasa's antics during the later stages of Siege of Ulsan were caused by his experience during Battle of Jiksan.

11. Same caveats also apply to Shishido Mototsugu's vanguard. It is unclear how many troops he committed into the fight. At best, we can be reasonably certain that there were several thousands Japanese troops engaging Ming cavalry until Mōri Hidemoto showed up with massive reinforcement.

12. It should be noted that Kuroda Kafu (『黒田家譜』, Kuroda clan's genealogy records), the main Japanese source recording the event from Kuroda Nagamasa's perspective, clearly referenced earlier Ming and Korean sources during its writing. Thus, the author of Kuroda Kafu almost certainly had knowledge that Ming army only numbered 2,000—he simply decided to reject it to not make the Kuroda side look bad.

This also brings the reliability of Kuroda Kafu's descriptions of the battle (such as the "iron shields" used by Ming cavalry) into question. Unfortunately, most Ming and Korean sources are rather light on details, so Kuroda Kafu remains the go-to source for Japanese perspective of this battle.

By the way, Swope's erroneous estimation of 5,000-6,000 Ming troops (which is referenced in English Wikipedia entry of Battle of Jiksan, unfortunately) is likely based on Kuroda Kafu as well.

13. It seems improbable that Ming cavalry would bring cumbersome iron shields to an ambush. Nevertheless, though extremely rare Chinese cavalry had been using iron shields since at least Yuan Dynasty, and there is at least another mention of Ming troops using iron shields during Imjin War, so this cannot be simply dismissed out of hand either. In any case, the probability that Ming cavalry DIDN'T bring iron shields is far higher.

14. There is also a possibility that these "disguised Japanese troops" mistaken by Ming cavalry were Korean collaborationists.

15. Interestingly, one frontline report from Ming army records that Ming cavalry dismounted to engage the Japanese, while another one records that Ming cavalry fought them mounted. It is possible that it was a mix of both, or Ming troops were initially dismounted, but later remounted to chase after Japanese troops after defeating them in the counterattack.

16. In case anyone is wondering: Ming army did not employ any infantry or artillery during Battle of Jiksan, the battle was only fought for a single day, and Ming army did not receive any reinforcement during battle (Bai Sai's reinforcement was only dispatched AFTER the battle), contrary to popular narrative.

Not to mention it was extremely improbable for Ming army to cover a distance of roughly 90 km from Hanseong to Jiksan and then retreat for another 55 km from Jiksan to Suwon in such a short time while lugging cumbersome cannons (it is unclear how long did Ming cavalry take to move from Hanseong to Jiksan, but they retreated from Jiksan to Suwon in a single afternoon) .

17. It is clear from the fact that Battle of Jiksan happened at a hilly area whereas Sosapyeong is described as a grassy plain, that these were two separate battles.

18. The mysterious "ape soldiers" apparently became some kind of sensation in Korea after Imjin War, although records about their actions only date to late 17th century at the earliest. Obviously, the reliability of such accounts are quite dubious.

Shown above is a section of a Korean painting from 1725, depicting the sending off of Ming troops after the conclusion of Imjin War. These weird furry creatures are the "ape soldiers".

19. The Chinese wouldn't know about the exact number of Japanese troops in Korea either, although they were well aware that they were heavily outnumbered.

20. The first skirmish of the pursuit happened on October 26, where Ming commanders Bai Sai and Cai Deng Ke (柴登科) caught up and attacked Japanese (Mōri Hidemoto's) army, beheading 18. Two days later, they were joined by another Ming commander Peng You De (彭友德) and attacked the Japanese once again near Geum River, beheading another 46.

A third skirmish happened near Hyeonggang River (형강 or 荊江, name of the middle course of Geum River), where Ming army beheaded another 155 Japanese troops. The same skirmish can also be found in Mōri Kaki (『毛利家記』, Mōri clan records), although Japanese version of the event describes Mōri Hidemoto defeating a major Ming-Joseon coalition army numbering 40,000-50,000 and killed thousands.