What was Dao Chao (搗巢)?

In my previous blog post I discussed a tacital formation used by Ming cavalry during Dao Chao operation. But what exactly was Dao Chao?

Objectives of Dao Chao

Dao Chao (搗巢) was part of the broader Ming defensive strategy against the Mongols along with Gan Ma (趕馬, stealing horses from the Mongols as well as dispersing their herds), Shao Huang (燒荒, burn away pastures), as well as building/fortifying the Great Wall. It was the most aggressive tactic among them, but also the most risky.

Dao Chao was a raid operation that targeted Mongol settlements that moved too close or inside Chinese borders. It was almost always conducted together with Gan Ma operation, as stealing Mongol horses and livestock was considered top priority, with capturing women, children and elderly as well as physically destroying the settlement being a distant second. Killing of able-bodied males was comparatively low in priority, as survivors from such a raid would usually starve or freeze to death anyway.

Timing of the operation

Unlike Shao Huang operation, which was conducted seasonally (during autumn and winter), Dao Chao could be launched all year long, although it was usually conducted in response to increased Mongol movement and migration towards the Great Wall, either as a precautionary measure to prevent Mongol raids from happening, or as a counter-raid in response to Mongol raiding activities. Sometimes Ming troops conducting Shao Huang operation may also launch opportunistic Dao Chao along the way.

Despite the flexibility, it was generally preferable to launch Dao Chao operation during springtime and sprint-to-summer transition, when old grass withered away, new grass had yet to mature, and Mongol horses were at their weakest.

Planning and managing the operation

Dao Chao was a high risk military operation, and thus required meticulous planning and careful execution to ensure its success. In general, Dao Chao operation followed the following steps:

1) Scouting: Ye Bu Shou (夜不收) agents would be dispatched to reconnoitre a Mongol settlement to collect necessary and time-sensitive intelligence such as location, distance from Chinese border, number of tents, strength of the defenders and so on. Mongol camps detected at around 200 li (about 115 km) from the Great Wall would be a cause of caution (as this was the distance where Mongol raiders could easily launch raids into Chinese lands, and conversely Ming cavalry could also easily launch counter-raid over the same distance) and would usually prompt an immediate Dao Chao response.

2) Mustering of raiding party: While lighting-fast raids with ad hoc formation and forced march were not unheard of, more commonly the raiding party would be carefully organised, with specialised crack troops, two flanks and two wings, as well as accompanied by war carts and infantry of the supporting force for the early part of the journey. Sometimes, even nearby garrisons were mobilised to help secure the flanks of the raiding party.

3) Launching the raid: Generally speaking, supporting force would travel together with the raiding party for the first 20~30 li (about 11.5~17.3 km) of the journey outside the Great Wall and set up a main base camp at a suitably defensible position. Raiding party would then continue the journey on its own, marching only at night to avoid detection, and setting up new camps every 20~30 li as a means to maintain a line of communication, as well as serving as defensible positions to fall back to in case anything went wrong.

4) Return journey: After the operation, the raiding party would assume a defensive formation and travel back to friendly territory, picking up troops that were held in reserve in the camps along the way. These reserve troops would then serve as rearguard for the raiding party. If troops from nearby garrisons were mobilised, they could either join force with the raiding party to bolster its ranks, or attempt to harass or ambush the Mongols trailing behind the raiding party.

Effectiveness and consequences

Used properly, Dao Chao could dramatically degrade the Mongols' capability to launch raids into Chinese lands, even weakening them to the point where some Mongol tribes were forced to make peace with Ming Dynasty for their survival. However, it also came with the risk of incurring Mongols' wrath and vengeance, causing even more bloodshed and instability. As such, whether border garrisons were encouraged or discouraged to conduct Dao Chao operation often depended on the current policy and mood in the Ming court, which was more often than not whimsical, passive, overly conservative, and slow to react to changing situation. At times overly conservative policy even allowed cowardly and irresponsible commanders to pressure their more courageous peers to cancel Dao Chao operation on the charge that they were trying to incite conflict with the Mongols and destabilise the region.

On the flip side, Dao Chao could also be misused and abused, and this became increasingly common towards the later period of Ming Dynasty. Powerful commanders that maintained large numbers of expensive Jia Ding (家丁) retinue (and thus had incentive to seek out extra source of revenue) abused Dao Chao and used the income from the raid to strengthen and grow their elite private armies, which in turn became even more effective at conducting Dao Chao, essentially creating a self-perpetuating feedback loop. In fact, Dao Chao business was so lucrative that some commanders disregarded Ming court's policy, even going so far as to intentionally sabotaging genuine chance for peace. As such, while their action greatly contributed to the gradual decline of Mongols, it came at the expense of long-term stability and prosperity of regions under their purview.