Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 04JAN24 17:00 PST - North Korea is Supplying SRBMs to Russia

Earlier today, United States National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications, John Kirby, released declassified information accusing North Korea of supplying Russia with Kn-23 short-range ballistic missiles and launch vehicles. The claim was made hours after the U.S. news agency The Wall Street Journal ran a story that Russia had received North Korean SRBMs and was negotiating with Iran.

The first incident was in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast on December 30, with the missile landing in a field. The next incident was on January 2, with multiple missiles striking Kharkiv, wounding at least 44 and killing two people. 

Shortly after Kirby's press conference, Ukraine released photos from Kharkiv showing missile debris that is definitely inconsistent with S-300/S-400 antiaircraft missiles.

Externally, the Kn-23 closely resembles the Russian Iskander-M SRBM, with a few visual differences and significant technical differences. A Ukrainian Telegram channel released additional photos, claiming to be debris from the January 2 strike on Kharkiv. In the attached image (white background), there is a single nozzle for a directional vane remaining, with the mounting surface appearing to be flat. This is consistent with a Kn-23 and is a feature the Russian Iskander-M (and its close relatives, the Iskander-K and Kh-47 Kinzhal) do not have.

The United States has vowed to add more sanctions against Russia and North Korea and to request a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. 

With a range of up to 700 kilometers, a HE warhead of up to 500 kilograms, and a CEP (accuracy) of 100 to 200 meters, the Kh-23 is better in almost every way compared to using S-300/S-400 air defense missiles for a ground attack.

In our assessment, the evidence is quite substantial that Russia is receiving SRBMs from North Korea to support its war of aggression against Ukraine. Ukrainian air defenses are seriously challenged by this new threat due to the very short time to target, particularly against Kharkiv. It is impossible to identify a launch, project its track and target, develop a firing solution, and intercept in under five minutes. Further, only IRIS-T and Patriot can intercept SRBMs, and Ukraine is likely already forced to conserve their Patriot interceptor inventory.

Bluntly put, even if the United States restarts military aid, and we are very pessimistic that it will, Russia, Iran, and North Korea combined can build more SRBMs, air-to-surface ballistic missiles, and supersonic cruise missiles that use a ballistic trajectory for the terminal phase than Ukraine's allies can build PAC-3 interceptors.